미얀마의로 힝야 무슬림들

2016 년 노벨 평화상 수상자 인 아웅산 수지 여사의 민주주의 연맹이 이끄는 미얀마 (버마)에 민주적으로 선출 된 새 정부가 형성되었지만,로 힝야 (Rohingya)로 알려진 박해 된 무슬림 소수 민족에 대한 상황은 여전히 ​​심각했다. 2016 년 8 월 정부는 유엔 사무 총장 코피 아난 (Kofi Annan)을 자문위원 회의 장으로 임명하여 평가를 수행하고 권고안을 제시 할 것을 촉구했다.

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로 힝야는 누구입니까?

로 힝야 (Rohingya)라는 용어는 일반적으로 미얀마의 라킨 (Arakan) 주 북부에 위치한 두 도시에 집중된 무슬림 공동체를 지칭하기 위해 특히 국제 매체에서 통용되었다. 방글라데시의 난민 캠프뿐만 아니라 국가. 로힝 야족은 라킨 주 인구의 3 분의 1을 차지했고, 라킨 불교도는 나머지 2/3의 상당 부분을 차지하고있는 것으로 추정되었다.

로 힝야 (Rohingya)라는 용어의 사용은 미얀마에서 크게 논란이되었다. 로 힝야 정치 지도자들은 그들의 민족이 7 세기 후반까지 거슬러 올라가는 독특한 민족적, 문화적, 언어 적 공동체라고 주장했다. 그러나 더 광범위한 불교 인구는 일반적으로로 힝야 용어를 벵골어로 대신 거부했으며, 공동체가 오늘날 방글라데시의 불법 이민자로 구성되어 있다고 생각했다. 미얀마 정부는 2014 년 인구 조사 (30 년 만에 처음으로 실시)를하면서로 힝야 (Rohingya)로 자기 신분을 밝히기를 원하는 사람들을 열거하지 않기 위해 11 시간 동안 결정을 내렸다. 이번 조치는 라킨 불교도의 인구 조사에 대한 위협으로 보이콧되었다.그 과정에서 정부는 국제 센서스 표준을 준수하겠다는 초기의 약속을 철회했다.

As with the rest of Myanmar’s postindependence borderlands that were historically multiethnic and politically fluid, Rakhine state had also suffered from decades of centre-periphery imbalances. On the one hand, Buddhist Rakhines had long felt oppressed by the Burmans, the country’s largest ethnic group, and on the other hand, they perceived the Muslim population to be a palpable threat to their cultural identity. Within the Myanmar context, race and ethnicity were rigid constructs that determined legal, political, and social relations. The debate surrounding the Rohingya terminology had, as such, paralyzed meaningful government recognition of the predicament of the Rohingya community.

Statelessness.

Almost all Rohingya in Myanmar were stateless. They were unable to obtain “citizenship by birth” in Myanmar because the 1982 Citizenship Law did not include the Rohingya on the list of 135 recognized national ethnic groups. The law had historically been arbitrarily applied in relation to those, such as the Rohingya, who did not fall strictly within the list of recognized ethnic nationalities. The legal status of a large majority of Rohingya was rendered even more precarious when Pres. Thein Sein unexpectedly announced in February 2015 the expiry of “white cards,” a form of temporary identity documentation held by many within the Rohingya community.

Intercommunal Violence and Displacement.

Two waves of intercommunal violence between Buddhist and Muslim communities in Rakhine state in June and October 2012 led to the displacement of approximately 140,000 people—the large majority of whom were Rohingya—to camps around the state capital (Sittwe) and surrounding townships. According to government figures, the conflicts resulted in 192 deaths, 265 injuries, and the destruction of 8,614 homes, with the impact disproportionately borne by Muslim communities. Human Rights Watch, as well as other nongovernmental organizations, claimed that the October 2012 violence was a coordinated campaign targeting the Rohingya.

Legislative Restrictions.

Following the 2012 violence, other developments, including a series of proposed legislative measures (some of which were passed by Myanmar’s parliament), resulted in further restrictions on the limited rights of the Rohingya. Although those developments had a nationwide application, they were understood to affect mostly the Rohingya community.

In September 2014 an amendment to the 2010 Political Parties Registration Law came into force; the legislation effectively disallowed the Rohingya to form and be members of political parties. Less than six months later, the Constitutional Tribunal delivered an opinion that prevented noncitizens from voting in any national referendum. The legal implication of the decision, formalized in June 2015 with amendments to the election laws, was that Rohingya, who were considered noncitizens, would not be allowed to vote in the 2015 general elections, even if they had cast their ballots during the 1960, 1990, and 2010 elections. The development also represented a final and absolute curtailment of the political rights of the Rohingya.

In November 2014 a package of draft laws popularly termed “laws on safeguarding race and religion” was submitted in the parliament for debate. The bills, which were initially proposed in 2013, were to an extent premised on anxieties over Myanmar’s being surrounded by highly populated countries, a factor that was believed to potentially affect the country’s demographics; on fears that Buddhist women were being coerced or tricked into marriages by and with non-Buddhist men; and on stereotypical views that Muslim families were polygamous and that consequently many children were being born. The bills were conceived as a necessary measure to protect Buddhist women and to address the perceived high population growth rate in Rakhine state.

Between May and July 2015, two of the four bills that permitted the state to regulate birth spacing and family planning, as well as to police the practice of religion within multireligious families, were passed by the parliament. The Population Control Healthcare Bill, which was aimed at Muslim women, could potentially be used to force women to space their births at least three years apart.