슈퍼인플레이션 대비해야하는 이유 옐런미국재무부장관 청문회 (할 수있다 2024)
2011 년 유럽에서 자비가 가까워지면서 대륙 경제는 시간이 갈수록 위기에 빠지는 것처럼 보였습니다. 그것은 서구 세계의 다른 곳을 뒤로 끌겠다고 위협했다. 2008 년 말에 시작된 세계 경기 침체는 공식적으로 18 개월 동안 지속되어 2009 년 6 월에 끝났습니다. 2011 년 낙관론자들은 세계 경제가“이중 침체”를 피할 수 있기를 희망했지만 비관론자들은 두 번째 경기 침체가 이미 시작되었다고 생각했습니다.
많은 관찰자들은 유럽이 선을 행하려는 본능에 의해 낮아졌고 19 세기에 많은 유럽 국가들이 취임 한 금도금 사회 복지 시스템은 단순히 비용이 들지 않는다고 믿었습니다. 새로운 부채는 오래된 부채에 쌓여 정부 채권에 대한 금리를 정부가 감당할 수없는 수준까지 끌어 올렸다. 5 개 EU 국가는 채권 은행이 부채의 최대 절반을 용서했거나 27 개 회원국이 재정 지원을 제공했기 때문에 파산을 피했습니다. 일반적으로 지원은 사회 복지 프로그램의 삭감에 초점을 맞추었지만 정부가 그러한 조건에 도달했을 때 시민들은 때때로 폭력적인 항의로 거리에 쏟아졌습니다.
상황이 가장 심했던 그리스는 막대한 부채로 거의 채무 불이행으로 국가 경제 규모에 비해 EU에서 가장 큽니다. 유로존 회원 7 명 명단에서 버려지면서 환율 혼돈을 낳을 수있는 결과를 얻었습니다. 그리스는 앙겔라 메르켈 독일 총리와 프랑스 총리의 압력을 받아 채권자 은행이 그런 일시적인 상황을 피했다. 니콜라스 사르코지 (Nicolas Sarkozy)는 그리스 채권에서 50 %의 손실을 입었습니다. EU와 IMF는 그리스에 1,400 억 달러의 새로운 구제 금융을 제공했습니다.
As in Greece, governments fell in Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Portugal, Slovakia, and Spain. Italy, the third largest economy in the EU and second only to Greece in the relative size of its debt, joined the parade in November when longtime Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi was replaced in office just days after Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou.
The EU giants were not much better off. France, the second largest member, was thought to have an unsustainable mountain of debt. Even though traditional economic powerhouse Germany’s growth rate had outpaced that of its major EU partners and the U.S. during the previous two years, by the end of 2011, it could find no buyers at any price for some of its bonds. Overall EU growth in the third quarter of 2011 was only 0.2% greater than in the second, and many analysts judged that several EU countries had sunk back into the recessions that they had escaped just a year or two earlier.
The euro was perhaps the most visible expression of Europe’s effort at harmony after two terrible world wars in the first half of the 20th century. Failure to preserve the currency would have raised questions about the Continent’s commitment to move ahead as one instead of many. In the end, leaders of 26 of the 27 European Union member countries—all but the U.K.—supported a measure to enforce rules for fiscal discipline and to pledge additional funds to member countries whose debt threatened to swamp them. The agreement came 20 years to the day after the European Council gathered on Dec. 9, 1991, in Maastricht, Neth., to negotiate the economic and monetary union that ultimately led to the common currency.
Unlike the 2008 financial crisis, which began in the U.S. housing market, the 2011 version was distinctly European in origin and style. Its effects, however, were similar—there was precious little loan money to be had—and the consequences washed over the entire free-market world. Would-be lenders feared that even their most-reliable European borrowers would be unable to pay them back. They demanded high interest rates—if they were willing to lend at all. Without loans, companies could not secure the money they needed to cover their costs and meet their financial obligations. More pointedly in the high-unemployment economy of 2011, they could not get funds to hire new workers. At the same time, Europe could not afford to invest in the U.S., thus decreasing the funds available for growth there. Trade between Europe and North America receded.
The U.S. economy, reflecting Europe’s troubles, grew at an annual rate of only 1.8% in the third quarter of 2011 and 1.5% for the year ended in the third quarter.For the four years ended in that quarter, the U.S. economy was essentially stagnant, growing at an anemic 0.4% average annual rate. Late in November the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development slashed its estimate of U.S. growth in 2012 from 3.1% to 2%. Other forecasters made similar adjustments.
The U.S. worried that it was losing the global dominance that it had enjoyed for the more than 60 years following World War II. In 2010 China had overtaken Japan as the world’s second largest economy, and it seemed only a matter of time before its economy, growing at a reliable 8–12% a year, passed that of the U.S.
China benefited from its economic as well as its geographic distance from the Western financial powers. It was barely grazed, at least for the time being, by the debt crisis. Although Chinese manufacturing had declined slightly by year’s end as its overseas markets took a pounding, foreign direct investment continued to flourish as investors looked for more-dependable markets than those they found in the West. For the future, however, some analysts argued that China’s housing prices were too high to last, and they forecast a bursting housing bubble akin to the one that triggered the U.S. financial crisis in 2008. Poor working conditions continued to cast a shadow over China’s labour force, which in any case was not expected to keep pace with the population as a whole because the country’s long-standing one-child limit ensured that fewer young adults were entering the workforce.
India could not achieve China’s consistent pace, but its GDP growth had rebounded from a quarterly low of 5.8% during the global recession (2009) to a quarterly high of 9.4% in 2010. The World Bank, in line with other forecasters, estimated that India’s economy grew by 8% in 2011 and that it would continue to grow 8–9% for the next two years. Largely sheltered from the effects of the European debt crisis, India deregulated some industries and privatized others. Although more than half of India’s workforce was in agriculture, the large English-speaking workforce accounted for half of the country’s GDP.
For Japan the earthquake and resulting tsunami of March 11 could hardly have come at a worse time. In addition to killing more than 19,000 people, the natural disaster was an economic calamity, forcing several nuclear power plants, most notably Fukushima Daiichi, to shut down and causing rolling blackouts. Companies such as Toyota, Honda, Nissan, Toshiba, Sony, and Texas Instruments were compelled to shutter plants. Exports, the lifeblood of the Japanese economy, fell more than 10% from May 2010 to May 2011. According to the World Bank, Japan’s overall GDP growth of 0.1% brought it closer than any other major industrial country to negative growth in 2011. (See Special Report.)
After the 2008 financial crisis, the U.S. and the EU adopted very different strategies for keeping ahead of the soaring Asians. The Europeans, obsessed by inflation, insisted on tight budgetary discipline related to requirements for EU membership (though even the fastidious Germans did not meet the national debt limit of 60% of GDP and only occasionally held their annual deficit below the maximum 3%). Meanwhile, for the American Democratic Party, which controlled the White House and both houses of Congress in 2009 and 2010, averting a deep recession or even a depression following the 2008 financial crisis was paramount. U.S. Pres. Barack Obama pushed legislation through Congress that authorized more than $700 billion in programs designed to propel economic growth.
Whether the stimulus package had achieved that goal was still a matter of dispute in 2011, but it certainly had contributed to a U.S. deficit that reached $14 trillion during the crisis. Republicans demanded spending cuts, whereas their Democratic opponents said that the ailing economy needed more medicine. The stalemate persisted through much of 2011 and seemed likely to affect the 2012 presidential election campaign.
